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1Note:  W hat Light Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Shed on the Civil Rights Act
of 1964?
The 1964 C ivil Rights Act was the first serious anti-racist law to pass the
U.S. Congress since a similar, but much less comprehensive law w as enacted 89
years earlier, during the First Reconstruction.  W hat sort of struggle led to the
proposal and adoption of the 1875 law, how has that law been viewed by  historians,
what effects did it have, and what parallels and differences were there between the
1875 and 1964 episodes?  W hat can we learn about the Second Reconstruction by
comparing it w ith the F irst? (See Kousser 1992 for a fu ller d iscussion o f the tw o
eras , roughly 1865-1895 and 1950-1990) 
M uch  of the public 's a ttention in 1964, espec ially in the S outh, focused on
the  public  accommodations section, T itle II o f the A ct.  W ould segregation in
hotels, motels, restaurants, and theaters, at public meetings, sports events, and
governmental offices be swept away?  W hat non-historians may not realize is how
similar the provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act were to that section of the 1964
Act.  Thus, Section 1 of the 1875 Act stated, in pertinent part, "That all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoym ent of the accom modations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public  conveyances on land  or water, theatres, and  other p laces of public
amusem ent; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
     1The differences in these sections of the two laws w ere chiefly  in the greater
specificity  and detail in the more modern code and the explicit prohibition of
segregation (a term not in wide use in 1875) in the 1964 law.
     2Of course, the 1875 Act  was much m ore limited than the 1964 Act, having no
provisions regard ing  em ploym ent, fund cutoffs, or voting.  M y comparison is meant
to be lim ited  to T itle II o f the 1964 A ct.
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applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude." (U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 18, p. 335)
 The  relevant part o f the 1964 A ct read :  "A ll persons shall be entitled to  the  full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accomm odations of any place of public accomm odation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national orig in."1 (Title II, Section 201  (a), Public L aw  88-352 (Ju ly 2, 1964))
In ligh t of the  sim ilarities in  prov isions  be tween the tw o A cts 2, it is shocking
how differently they have fared in history books.   The historiography of the 1964
Act is almost who lly celebratory.  The real question in the Filvaroff and W olfinger
paper, Chapter 1 of this volume, is:  W ho will share in the glory of the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act?  In stark contrast, almost no one from 1875 to the
present has asked that question about the 1875 Civil Rights Act.  Indeed, much of
the h istoriography of the F irst Reconstruction has been and  still is very
antagon istic.  To oversim plify , the rac ist "Dunning S choo l" of historians early  in
this century thought the F irst Reconstruction radica l, anti-racist, and therefo re
wrong ; whereas, m any m ore recent h istorians, as strong ly aga inst rac ial inequa lity
3as the Dunningites were for it, believe the First Reconstruction too conservative and
the R econstructionists e ither too racist o r too insincere, and therefore still wrong. 
(See S tampp 1965 and Foner 1988 for m ore balanced  treatments)
The  1875  Act's condem natory treatment by  his torians w as perhaps brought to
a height in W illiam Gillette 's 1979 book, Retreat From Reconstruction, 1869-1879. 
Gillette's questions about the 1875 Civil Rights Act are essentially:  How  can we
destroy the illusion of idealism?  How  can we belittle its significance?  In a chapter
title, he calls it "an insignificant victory;" in a peroration, "little more than the
illusion  of achievement, the most meaningless piece of postw ar [i.e., post-C ivil
W ar] legislation."   The only reason it passed, Gillette says, w as because people
expected that it "would never operate effectively."  The sum mation of his chapter
on the Act, which is the longest recent treatment by a historian, could hardly be
harsher:  
The Republicans, then, had once again indulged in em pty ritualism,
the results of which were more often negative than constructive.  The
law such represented the bankruptcy of legislative sentimentality and
Reconstruction rhetoric, which demeaned noble ideals and undercut
vital interests.  For many disillusioned radicals the act was the expiring
act of the  now obsolete ph ilanthropy.  For most other R epub licans it
was an unw elcome intrusion in an unnecessary initiative.  Had great
resu lts followed , the cost w ould have been justified in some m easure. 
But the statu te had  reaped the w hirlwind  of rac ist reaction  and it
served on ly to weaken the R epublican party, to disappoint the blacks,
and to further discredit the integrity of the law.  It was the deadest of
dead letters. (Gillette 1979, 271, 273, 279)  
In other w ords, in G illette 's view , the 1875  Act w as an  insubstantia l fraud  tha t on ly
4benefited reac tionaries w ho used its shadow to frighten the gullible white masses. 
Are there any words or sentiments of disapprobation that the historian somehow
neglected to include?
In fac t, the reputa tion  of the  1875  Act among h istorians in  the  1990s is
probably worse than in the 1970s, because political history is so completely out of
fashion in the 1990s.  A graduate student who  would go to work now in political
history is considered neanderthal, antediluvian .  The cultural history  of " texts"   --
and anything nonpolitical qualifies as a text -- is the current fashion.  Today , most
young A merican  his torians w ou ld not even know of the  ex istence of the 1875 A ct,
and the few who  did  wou ld a lmost surely  be  ignorant abou t the strugg le that led to
the 1875 Civil Rights Act and, indeed, to civil rights acts all over the country in the
nineteenth century.  For them as well as other audiences, let me recount a few not
very w ell-know n facts.
 The hub  of that struggle was B oston.  There, in 1842, the first
well-documented movement for a civil rights law in a state legislature took place.
(Kousser 1988) After several incidents in which black passengers were excluded
from "white" railroad cars, associates of the abolitionist W illiam L loyd Garrison
agitated in the legislature to ban segregated railroad cars by law.  The agitation
failed to  produce a  statute  on ly because the  railroads in M assachusetts eventua lly
all agreed  to elim inate J im  Crow cars and to serve everybody equally.  
The m ore lengthy and difficult campaign for school integration in the Bay
State served through new spaper reports and pamphlets as a primer for racial
5reformers and their opponents throughout the North.  Beginning in 1840 with a
pe tition  to the B oston  Schoo l Com mittee, black  and w hite  Garrisonians  pushed  to
abolish the "co lored" schoo ls of that c ity and  to in tegrate  ch ildren in to schoo ls
comm on to all.  W hen renewed and expanded petition drives in 1844, 1846, and
1849 failed, antislavery forces filed  the famous case of Roberts v. Boston in 1849-50. 
Before the M assachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the integrationists were repre-
sented by R obert M orris, perhaps the second A frican-American  to be adm itted to
practice law  in the country, and  Charles Sum ner, the  abolitionist Boston  Brahmin
who w ould be elected to the U.S. Senate in 1851.  Sum ner's 80-page brief, which he
arranged to have published by B enjamin Roberts, the black printer whose daughter
was refused admittance into the white school, contained every argum ent that has
been  made in  the  twentieth  centu ry on  school in tegration, except those rela ted  to
busing, which Sum ner was not foresighted enough to anticipate.  The abolitionists'
defeat at the hands of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, who had extensive landholdings
below the Mason-Dixon line, only increased the agitation, until in 1855,
M assachusetts became the first state in the country to institute a school integration
law.  Interestingly, the legislature that passed that law virtually unanimously was
overw helming ly dom inated  by  the  miscalled "Know-Noth ings," who  in
M assachusetts, at least, were one of the most liberal, anti-racist, and egalitarian
groups in the nineteenth century.
In 1865 , M assachusetts became the first sta te to  pass a pub lic
accommodations law by banning racial discrim ination in "any licensed inn, . . .
     3This w as the third  greatest percentage loss by a major political party in Am erican
history, exceeded only by Republican losses in the 1890 election (49%) and
Dem ocratic losses in the 1894 election (53% ).  By con trast, in 1994, D em ocrats  lost
21%  of their seats.
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public place of amusem ent, public conveyance or public meeting."   Nationally,
once slavery seemed on the road to ultimate extinction, Sen. Charles Sum ner began
an assault on segregation that would end only with his death.  In 1862 he w as
largely responsible for an amendm ent to the charter of the Washington, Alexandria,
and Georgetown R ailroad which prohibited Jim  Crow cars.  That action led to the
firs t U .S. Supreme C ourt case on integration, Railroad Company v. Brown (1873), in
which the majority on the Supreme Court, as liberals often do, decided the issue on
the narrowest possible grounds, in this instance, that Sum ner's amendm ent to the
railroad charter prohibited segregation.  By following proper judicial practice, the
Court unintentionally allowed m uch more conservative courts to sidestep the
precedent when they considered the question of whether segregation was violative
of common law or the T hirteen th or Fourteen th Amendmen ts.  
Sum ner first introduced a national civil rights bill in 1867.  It passed the
Senate in 1872, 1873, and 1874, and finally succeeded in the House in the
lame-duck session of 1875 after the Republicans lost 47%  of their seats in the 1874
elections, bringing the national phase of Reconstruction largely to an end.3  In a
comprom ise to obta in the votes of a few  marg ina l mem bers, the R epub licans had to
delete p rovisions in tegrating churches  and schools from the b ill at the las t m omen t. 
Nonetheless, it was quite a far-reaching and controversial law.
7Not only  was it bitterly fought over, bu t the  ba ttle lines correlated perfectly
with partisanship.  T his  is one  of the  ch ief d ifferences betw een the c ivil rights
movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  In Congress from 1867
through 1875, no  Dem ocrat ever voted  for a  version of Sum ner's civil rights bill.  In
fact, throughout the who le nineteenth century, no D em ocratic m em ber of Congress
ever voted  for a  civil rights or voting  rights bill. (Kousser 1992, 150-51)  In  sharp
contrast, bipartisan support was crucial to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and the 1965 Voting R ights Act, as well as to the renewals of the Voting R ights Act
in 1970, 1975, and 1982.  One reason that civil rights progress was so fragile in the
nineteenth century was that Republican proponents could rarely expect any
assistance from  even a small num ber of Dem ocrats.  The issue marked the clearest
line of partisan distinction, and Dem ocrats resisted every advance and repealed
every  pro-civ il righ ts provision  the  first chance they  go t.   (To som eone  steeped  in
the  fac ts of the n ine teenth  centu ry strugg les, current R epub lican a ttacks  on  minority
opportunities raise  disturbing parallels.)
Ano ther difference between the movements in the two centuries was that
African-American action in the 1870s was much  more traditional in its modes than
were the sit-ins of the 1960s.  To be sure, during the 1860s and 70s, there were a
few boycotts of segregated streetcars.  But mostly, the newly freed and
enfranchised slaves plunged into conventions, conferences, political canvassing,
and legal cases -- at least a hundred lega l cases in the nineteenth century
challeng ing  rac ial d iscrim ination  in schoo ls, for instance.  Instead  of a S elm a
8M arch, blacks in the previous century wrote editorials in their own newspapers, ran
for office, and fram ed antidiscrimination b ills them selves.
There w ere three reasons for th is rather surprising diffe rence  in the two eras . 
First, segregation w as m uch less en trenched in the 1870s and  race  relations were
much m ore flu id.  W e like to  think o f ourselves, of course, as living in  the  on ly
enligh tened  era  tha t has ever ex isted, but in  many w ays things w ere  much w orse in
the 1950s and  60s -- in particular, segregation had becom e so  much m ore
entrenched  tha t it seem ed nearly  impossible  to overthrow.  To do so took  drastic
and extrem ely  widespread action.  Second, b lacks were  much better connected  with
the power structure in the 1870s than in the 1960s.  They did not need thousands of
sit-ins, because they could go right to their (mostly, but not all white) Republican
friends, and their Republican friends could pass whatever they wanted to, because
they had sufficient majorities in Congress before 1874.  Third, the legislative
structure w as m uch m ore malleab le; the ru les w ere m uch sim pler and  more
favorable to reform.  Senate rules in the 1870s did not allow filibusters, and
although  the  House perm itted much m ore unlim ited  deba te, it took  on ly a  sm all
change  in the H ouse rules to cut o ff discussion and  pass the  Civil R igh ts B ill.
The com parative social and po litical rigidity of the two epochs suggests a
third broad contrast.  Segregation was so much m ore ingrained and inflexible in the
1960s than in the 1870s that when  the system began to give way, it shattered.  Thus,
the changes of the 1960s could become m uch m ore permanent because they
rep laced  a m uch m ore w ell-defined  structure, ra ther than  the  comparatively  fluid
9pattern of race relations of the late 19th century.  Likewise, after 1964, the filibuster
no longer seemed so formidable a barrier to civil rights bills that they had to be
abandoned or severely watered down.  1964 both made racial behavior change
rapidly in the South and facilitated further governmentally-sponsored change.
A fourth distinction between the two eras was that the 1875 law, which rested
only on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent, was ruled
unconstitutional by the U .S. Suprem e Court, while the 1964 A ct, which also
referred to the C ommerce  Clause, passed the C ourt's  muster. (The Civil Rights Cases
(1883); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S. (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)) 
Perhaps one  explana tion  for the d ifference in h istorians' treatm ent of the  two laws is
that the 1875 Act did not stay in effect long enough for its direct impact to be
unmistakable.  Historians celebrate long-lived winners.  But in a larger sense, the
1875 Act both reflected and produced smaller victories, for nearly every state in the
north and seven of the eleven ex-Confederate states passed similar laws, either as
part of the agitation that led up to the national act, as a spinoff from that agitation,
or as an attempt to rectify a wrong, at least at the state level, when the Supreme
Court invalidated  the national C ivil Rights Act.  In Ohio, for instance, where m ore
school segregation cases were filed in the nineteenth century than in any other state,
a com prehensive c ivil rights  bill, w hich mandated  rac ial in tegration in  public
accom modations and schools and lifted the previous ban on  interracial marriages,
passed in 1887, the end result of protests against the Supreme Court decision in The
Civil Rights Cases.
     4Plessy v. Ferguson was decided in 1896, 30 years after Congress passed the Four-
teenth  Am endm ent.  Right-wing Republicans took over Congress in 1994, 30  years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, M edicare, and the W ar on Poverty.  The
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A fifth contrast is that the two laws were passed at different points in the
recurring cycles of attitudes about race and government.  Both the First and Second
Reconstructions witnessed rapid changes in white racial attitudes and behavior.  But
1875, we are conventionally told, was near the end of such a period of change, near
the 1877  date when h istory lectures and books typically terminate the First
Reconstruction, while we know from survey research that a substantial
liberalization of white racial attitudes continued long after 1964. (Schuman, Steeh,
and Bobo 1985)  In fact, northern white views and actions continued to alter in a
liberal d irec tion  long a fter 1877 , although  southern  white  op inions generally  did
not. (Kousser 1986; 1991) Conversely, most of the changes in white attitudes since
1964 have been confined to the South.  Thus, the contrast between the centuries
may  not be so sta rk as  suggested, depending on which region one concentrates on.   
  A similar caution holds for comparisons between the two eras' degrees of
governmental action.  Both laws came in periods of activism, the Civil W ar and
Reconstruction period being in many w ays the greatest period of governmental
accomplishment in Am erica since 1787.  1875 was at the end of a period of
national, but certainly not state-level energy.  1964, on the other hand, was the
apogee of its period's  activism, particu larly  at the nationa l level.  B oth
Reconstructions  he lped to  bring  abou t periods  of reaction w hich reached  the ir
height about 30 years after what might be called "High Reconstruction."4  Bu t that
phrase  "High Reconstruction" is suggested by "High Renaissance ."
     5President Andrew Johnson's calamitous 1866 campaign against the Radicals rein-
forced the  slaveho lders' earlier folly a t precisely the right m om ent.  Fo r comple tely
inept and unintended contributions to Am erican liberty, he m ust rank w ith the greatest
of Am erican presidents.
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is w hat we pay  for m om ents of liberal change that com e so in frequently in
Am erican history.
The dissimilarities in the causes of the mom ents of liberal opportunity in the
two eras, a sixth contrast, affected their degree of radicalism and perhaps the
permanency of their results.  It is often some disastrous miscalculation by
conservatives that produces the chance for change.  The greatest miscalculation
conservatives ever m ade in  the  United S tates w as seceding in  1860 , which led to
quite terrible disasters for them as well as for the country, but also to the end of
slavery and the passage  of the  Fourteenth  and F ifteenth  Amendm ents, which cou ld
probably not have passed at any other point in Am erican history, including the
present.5  In 1964, by  contrast, there w as no such conservative debacle or a
depression partly caused by inaction by the devotees of laissez-faire, as in 1893 and
1932 .  At the  time of the passage  of the  1964  Civil R igh ts A ct, the law could  on ly
be  a response to a  positive m ovem ent, the sit-ins and  demonstrations in  the  Sou th
and not, as during the First Reconstruction, a response further propelled by
conservative mistakes, m istakes that gave Radicals, for a time, a free hand.  As the
Filvaroff and W olfinger paper shows, liberals did not have a free hand in 1964, but
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had to win the support of moderates like W illiam M cCulloch and conservatives like
Everett D irksen.  T he  Second R econstruction w as therefore less rad ical, relative  to
practices and  be liefs of the  time, than  the  First, but a lso probably m ore d ifficu lt to
overthrow, because it was based on a w ider political consensus.
Although som e of the consequences of both the  1875 and 1964 A cts w ere
unintended, I think Filvaroff and W olfinger exaggerate when they say that no one
in 1964 got w hat they w anted .  In the 1870s, although  the  threat to pass the C ivil
Righ ts bill no  doub t lost the  Repub licans some seats in 1874  and a lthough courts
killed the law after less than a decade, it did inspire similar state-level laws, which
were very seldom  repealed, all over the N orth in the  late nineteenth century.  Every
former abolitionist knew that the struggle for civil rights for African-Am ericans
was difficult and that every course, even passing a law that they favored, risked
failure.  In the m ore successful actions of the 1960s, it seems to m e tha t the w inners
largely achieved their goals, while the losers accurately predicted what defeat
would mean for them  and the deeply racist society that they  preferred to preserve. 
Pro-civil rights Democrats and northern Republicans got a remarkably effective
bill.  W ithin a year, African-Americans could eat at most restaurants and stay at
most motels anywhere in the country, public programs at hospitals and other
fac ilities w ere  pretty  speedily  desegregated, the fund  cu toff provision  eventua lly
forced the dismantling of the formal structure of school segregation, and affirmative
action greatly increased black employment in governmental and private sector jobs
in a rapidly changing economy.  M oreover, the R epublican conservatives w ho were
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not concerned  one w ay  or another with civil rights even tually achieved  their goal, a
reaction against governmental activism on subjects that they cared more about.  The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not the only or even the most important law that en-
couraged that reaction, but it helped.  Finally, southern Dem ocratic conservatives
lost dram atically .  The  meticulously segregated, thorough ly and  openly
discriminatory society and polity tha t they tried to p rotec t withered, and after a
generation, the southern Dem ocratic conservative largely vanished, as well, gone
with the wind of racial and partisan change.
As we seemingly enter a new world in which government, particularly the
national governm ent, withdraws its protections against the vagaries of the free
market and  the  prejudices of a soc iety  still firm ly con trolled  by  whites, it is
appropriate to ce lebra te the accomplishments of bygone eras and  to see w hether w e
can learn m ore about how soc iety operates and  what is politically feasible if w e
study not one, but two parallel events together.
